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Dominant View 
f.:[o';'.:Will's perception of his father coming out of the cinema with a lover 
itn,Ybaused Will's immediate upset and his subsequent behaviour. This 
XúXú·DID= is how we would naturally describe what happened. From this perspec-
úyDKXW?íávÉI=Will's mental contents appear as distinctly active, as making a 
·Dáf?L·DdáffÉêÉncú=to what occurs next. Variations in Will's perceptions would 
áúE=have given rise to changes in his emotional reactions and behaviour. 
DKúmF· tÉ=take it that, for instance, ifWill had not seen Hannah Plown1an as 
\gjhis father's lover, there would not have been any interesting story to 
·_:·report. Still, this mentalistic narration appears to call for a complement. 
·· .(It seems that a neurophysiological sequence must somehow accompany 
) ;; Will's perceptual process; after all, if Will is to have some perceptions, 
;_(-: be upset or move his body, significant changes must take place in 
'.\ his physiology. The problem that concerns us is to find a credible account 
:;:; of how exactly these two processes, namely, the neurophysiological 
and the mental, are supposed to interrelate. What do our metaphysical 
intuitions tell us in this respect? This question articulates the con-
temporary debate about mental causation. 
'lb draw a precise map of the available answers to this question is a 
hard job, since pressure in the academic environment encourages people 
to adopt every possible position on the issue, and the scenario becomes 
as intricate as a spider's web. Still, the range of possible stances seems 
constrained by the presuppositions one has to grant in order to be rec-
ognized as an intelligible voice in the debate. And, in this respect, to treat 
a certain point of view as privileged, as the position with regard to which 
any other perspective is to be located, is part of what one should initially 
grant to enter a philosophical controversy. We consequently propose to 
introduce the current discussion on the causal efficacy of the mental by 
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putting forward, in Chapter 1, what we take it to be that dominant per-
spective on the issue. 
As we see it, the dominant approach represents an attempt to artic-
ulate two seemingly fundamental metaphysical intuitions, namely: the 
causal efficacy of the mental and the causal primacy of the physical. 
Moreover, they assume that our intuitions about the causal efficacy of 
the mental could be properly honoured only if one could show how our 
mental states arc causally efficacious in virtue of their mental properties. 
So, the crucial question becomes how mental properties could be 
causally relevant while, nevertheless, respecting the causal primacy of 
physical properties. 'Causal physicalism' is the name we propose to des-
ignate the kind of answer that the dominant perspective provides for 
that question and, therefore, it is meant to pick out a rather general meta-
physical picture, whose details n1ay be filled in several different ways. In 
this sense, 'causal physicalism' alludes to a set of theories that share a 
certain assumption, namely: that every case of nonphysical (and hence 
mental) causation has to be conceived as systematically dependent on 
certain physical processes that underlie it. In other words, the dominant 
view assmnes that the only way to render intelligible the idea of non-
physical causation is by reducing its autonomy, at least in this minimal 
sense. Whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy 
of the nonphysical properties involved in that process will ultimately 
depend on the instantiation of certain basic (physical) properties. For 
whatever the causal efficacy of a non physical property may be in ·a par-
ticular case, it cannot go beyond the causal powers of the physical prop-
erties that are involved on that particular occasion. 1 Hence, physical 
properties appear to the causal physicalist as the basic properties of the 
world, while the rest of the properties are realized in terms of those puta-
tive basic properties. The dominant view may then be provisionally char-
acterized as the attempt to vindicate the causal efficacy of the mental by 
showing that mental properties meet the demands that causal physical-
ism impose. 
There is, indeed, an important problem that such a view has to face, 
namely: to specify what those basic, physical properties are. Yet, we 
intend to be rather concessive with our opponents on this issue. It is true 
that some of the problems we will raise against causal physicalists in 
later chapters will turn out to be crucially related to their difficulties to 
provide a coherent account of the n1etaphysical virtues attributed to 
those physical properties. But, in any case, as we should talk in this 
chapter about the metaphysical requirements that physical and non-
physical properties are supposed to satisfy, we will not impugn the 
content of those principles on the basis that they would require a previ-
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ous specification of what a physical property may be. Instead, we will 
take for granted that there might be a certain minimal and interesting 
subset of properties that could satisfy such requirements. This con-
;,; cession fits the overall character of our challenge to causal physicalism, 
k . which has the structure of a reductio ad absurdum. Even granting certain 
{{ metaphysical principles that are proposed to motivate causal physical-
?> ism, this metaphysical position is in trouble mainly because they are 
forced to accept certain conclusions (for instance, massive overdeter-
mination) that no one (least of all the causal physicalist) is prepared to 
concede. 
So, we can say that the main purpose of this book is to elaborate 
a number of reductio arguments that are meant to challenge causal 
úú!D!DKW= physicalism, as well as the dominant view, in its attempt to show the 
NNú!I!á=compatibility between the causal efficacy of the mental and causal phys-úWú·YK=icalism. As a result, we will provide an alternative analysis of our Nú=:.:· 
intuitions about the primacy of the physical that fits with the causal 
autonomy of mental properties. 
In this context, we shall devote the present chapter to characterize 
and 1notivate the dominant view. In section 1, we intend to locate the ú=úKW=dominant stance within the debate on mental causation and, in section 
:Y';V2, we begin to describe the metaphysical motivation for causal physical-
EWúIKWF= ism. Thus, a physicalist principle is introduced which is meant to express 
t'i . a supposedly elementary intuition concerning the causal closure of the 
ú= physical world, as well as a statement that denies the existence of more 
than one complete and independent explanation of a single effect. These 
,_. two considerations jointly motivate, in section 3, a physicalist constraint 
that every causally responsible property must comply with. 'Strong 
úfXXI[K=Supervenience' is the tag attached to this physicalist requirement, and 
úúfD{iúÉêaldÉd=as one of the chief convictions of the dominant stance. 2 In 
úW[=section 4, we elucidate how physical properties must be conceived if 
N ú·= physicalist intuitions have to make sense; secondly, we connect Strong 
$upervenience with certain images about the intrinsicness of causally 
efficacious properties; and, finally, we emphasize that Strong Superve-
nience falls short of what the dominant view should demand and a 1nore 
stringent physicalist constraint is proposed instead. To close, we explore 
úfFI=úWóêúWsúúúWKáúv=úáúWWáIúÉXúúWáWúfúX=WWúúíúúúú·úXXúúú!cXúó=úúúWWú=
f'< hant stance. From the idea that mental causation has to be conceived as 
supervenient on the physical properties of certain objects, the dominant 
view tends to derive the claim that content can be causally efficacious 
only if it is narrow - only if it is not fixed by relational properties. A sub-
stantial portion of our labour in Chapters 2-4 will be to show that this 
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line of reasoning may have devastating effects, since it not only poses a 
problem to mental content, but also to functional properties and, in 
general, to the properties posited by special sciences such as biology, 
geology, and so forth. These severe results will prompt a revision of the 
arguments in favour of causal physicalism and, therefore, of the condi-
tions that causally efficacious properties are due to tneet. 
1 The Dominant View in the Debate on 
Mental Causation 
If it is really íêuú=that the content ofWill's perception had a certain effect 
on some of his other mental states, we should accept that certain 
differences in the content of his perception would have produced some 
differences in his other mental states. And, of course, the same is true 
regarding the causal efficacy of his mind on his behaviour. In fact, we 
accept that some aspects of that behaviour are an effect of his becom-
ing upset by the perception of his father's lover only because we assume 
that, had he felt happiness when realizing that this particular lady 
was his father's lover, his reaction would have been rather different. In 
general, we can then say that a mental state has certain effects in virtue 
of the properties of such a state, since differences in the properties of a 
mental state alter its capacity to bring about certain effects. 
There are_, indeed, three ways in which mental properties must be able 
to participate in causal processes. One, minds are affected by what 
happens in the physical world: the content of Will's perception seems 
to be causally dependent on certain inputs that reach his open eyes and 
alter his nervous system. Two, mental states can also influence other 
mental states: Will's perception of his father and the lady produces 
certain beliefs that disturb him. And, three, mental states can be causally 
responsible for our way of acting, as well as for some physiological 
changes in our body: Will's mood is the cause of his rushing towards 
home_, and of the strain in his stomach too. 
Unsurprisingly, an important part of the philosophical literature on 
mental causation has focused on the first and third cases, where the 
mental is claimed to interact with the physical. For most of the hard-
ships about mental causation derive from the fact that minds do causally 
interact with the material world. It seems that if we were able to under-
stand this interaction, we would also be able to account for mental-to-
mental processes, and mental causation would stop being a problem. 
How is it, then, possible for our minds to move the material world? 
How is it possible that certain mental properties could be causally 
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responsible for certain physical changes in the world, or vice versa? As úXúNDMnÉ=should expect., the dominant ans\Yer to this question emerges out of 
' the rejection of a number of alternatives. We shall, thus, explore in this 
section the reasons why those alternatives look scarcely attractive to the 
;'b. contemporary eye. First, we shall object to substantial dualism., and then f' ;:discount type-identity theories insofar as they may fail to respect the 
;c multiple reali:tabiliry of mental properties. This will give rise to func-
::. 
tionalism, which represents the version of causal physicalism to which 
.the dominant view subscribes. We shall see, however, that functionalism 
may not be so different from type-identity theories as one might expect, 
and that this similarity may point to a problem for the causal relevance 
of functional properties. We close by emphasizing how mere token-
.identity theories cannot solve the problems that functional theories may 
encounter in their attempt to account for the causal efficacy of the 
mental. 
Substantial dualism is almost universally envisaged as a manifestly 
unsatisfactory answer to the question as to how mental properties may 
intervene in the physical world. A classical defence of dualism can be 
found in Descartes' doctrines about mind and body interacting through 
the pineal gland. Descartes' idea was that res cogitans and res extensa 
should be conceived as two different kinds of stuff, that mental and 
· · physical properties are determinations of those different stuffs. The 
question is: how can determinations of such different substances 
interact? Descartes' own way of explaining this interaction shows how 
implausible his solution was. As some of his contemporaries realized, it 
is not easy to accept that a substance without extension could causally 
intermingle with the physical world. 3 This problem cannot be tackled by 
simply fixing a privileged point in the physical world, e.g. the pineal 
gland, where both substances actually interact. This kind of solution 
sounds as implausible as a hypothetical defence of the causal activity of 
the soul by a modern scientist who chooses to appeal to the (suppos-
edly) empirical fact that soul and body interact in the brain. In fact, it 
appears that no empirical discovery could really inform us about the 
putative ability of an immaterial substance to move the material world. 
Nowadays these critical intuitions tend to be expressed along the fol-
lowing lines. Causation cannot be a matter of magic; therefore, it should 
be taken for granted that, for any causal chain that affects the physical 
world, there must be a physical process that can explain the effect. The 
relevant intuition can be expressed as an intuition regarding explanation 
or as an intuition regarding causation. Let us turn again to Gordimer's 
novel. Will is upset because of a certain perceptual experience. His being 
upset is the cause of a certain piece of behaviour. Nevertheless, it seems 
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that we can assume that there is a complete causal explanation of his 
movements that does not include any mental predicates. This explana-
tion might mention, for instance, electrical changes in his brain, neuro-
physiological processes, movements in his muscles, etc. Following the 
current dominant tendency in the philosophy of mind, we may refer to 
this kind ofexplanation as a 'physical explanation' and, therefore, escape 
by now any controversy about the status of chemical or neurophysio-
logical predicates with regard to physics, that is, to the most basic science 
of nature. What seems to be clear, in any case, is that chemical and neu-
rophysiological predicates could not ever count as mental. 
These intuitions can also be expressed in metaphysical terms: prima 
facie, it seems that there is a chain of physical causation that is enough 
to produce the physical effect and that does not require the instantia-
tion of any mental property. Perhaps we do not know the entire physi-
cal story, but we assume that it must exist. This does not amount to 
saying that at some time scientists will actually be able to provide such 
a story. The point being raised is just a matter of principle: the domi-
nant view assumes that, if the causal story they told us were not a com-
plete one, a cmnpletion of it would require additional statements in 
which no mental term could properly appear. Every cellular reaction 
in our l;>ody demands an explanation which has to refer to the kind 
of process that we accept as a plausible candidate to excite cellular 
activity - and, certainly, it is not here where mental properties can find 
their proper causal role. 
There are not many moves that a dualist can make to face this basic 
intuition. And none of them has the slightest possibility of succeeding. 
One possibility could be to conceive the situation as a case of overde-
termination, like the death of a man who simultaneously receives several 
lethal stabbings. In each case in which our mind causally affects our 
body, there would at least be two different causal chains involved in the 
production of the same effect, both of them sufficient for it but none of 
them necessary. On this view, mental properties would not intervene in 
certain causal (physical) chains that produce a given effect, but they can 
intervene in some other parallel causal chain producing the very same 
effect. So, whenever our mind has causal influence on our body, the dif-
ferent causal chains fixing the relevant outcome are not necessary for it. 
Yet, it is commonly assumed that massive overdetermination counts as 
a reductio of any theory that entails it . .For causes are counterfactually 
necessary for their effects. 
There is no advantage in retouching the image and conceiving the 
mental chain as only 'helping' (i.e. not being enough) for the relevant 
physical outcome. Under the assumption that the physical chain is 
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;. enough, the mental contribution comes up as irrelevant. Had the mental 
hl. property been absent the physical chaáú=would still have done the causal 
ú···XDàobK=Consequently, it can never be true of Will that, if he had not seen 
úDKK= his father's lover and changed his mood because of this, he would not 
have reacted the way he did. So, it does not seem that the dualist has 
apprehended the idea that our minds can be causally responsible for 
; cerrain effects. 
· · · There is a different way in which a dualist may try to deal with this 
issue, namely: to conceive changes in the mental substance as epiphe-
, nomena, as effects of certain causal processes that have no causal con-
sequences. By this move, the dualist seeks to preserve . the common 
- intuition that mental states are necessary for certain events, while avoid-
(dng a conflict with the idea that there is always a sufficient causal, physi-
úW= cal explanation. Yet, the price to be paid is denying the causal efficacy 
WXúK·W·=
of mental properties. John's desire to drink a beer could be the effect of 
certain neurophysiological processes in John's brain, and those processes 
, might also be the cause of certain movements of John's body. But the 
-; . mental state itself would be deprived of any power to alter John's body. 
úú···• fí=is true, though, that even in this context, it could be argued that John's 
mental states are a necessary condition for its bodily movements. For a 
mental state M could be conceived as an inexorable outcome of a neu-
rophysiological chain P(l) that is, in turn, a necessary causal condition 




One could thus say that, if M had not been instantiated, P(2) would 
not have been instantiated either. For, without M, P(l) could not have 
been instantiated, given that P(I) is supposed to be a sufficient condi-
tion for M. Then, P(2) would not have been instantiated either, given 
that P(l) is supposed to be a necessary condition for the instantiation 
of P(2). Yet, if these are all the causal powers that mental properties may 
gather, we may safely affirm that mental properties have no causal power 
at all. Mental 'properties' become mere epiphenomena, and both 
philosophers and nature dislike epiphenomena, since causal efficacy 
counts as a mark of reality. 
All this has some crucial implications for the contemporary debate 
on mental causation. For the previous reflections not only supply an 
argument against substantial dualism, but also involve an explicit 
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de1nand for some kind of connection between mental properties and the 
physical world. Furthermore, given that the main objection to substan-
tial dualism has been that it concedes no relevant causal role to mental 
properties, it seems pointless to deny the existence of ghostly minds 
without saying anything about how the causal efficacy of mental prop-
erties is related to the causal efficacy of the nonmental chain that, we 
are assuming, is enough to move our bodies. 
There is indeed quite a natural way of dealing with these difficulties. 
If .mental properties were identical to some of the features of the 
material causal chain that is enough to move our body, then mental 
properties could after all be vindicated. This is the basic line of reason-
ing behind the so-called type-identity theories.'1 In fact, the previous criti-
cism of dualism crucially depends on the reluctance to accept any causal 
role for minds if there are complete physical explanations of their puta-
tive physical effects. But this objection suggests the idea that, no matter 
what the causal powers of mental states may be, they must be identical 
with the causal powers of certain subsets of the physical (neurophysio-
logical) states that are supposed to be enough to fix the complete 
physical (neurophysiological) explanation. And so we reach type-
identity theories. 
Nevertheless, there is an important problem that has put type- · 
identity theories out of fashion for many years, namely: the multiple 
realizability of mental properties. For, there is no reason to think that a 
mental type (for instance 'to be in pain' or 'to believe that Paris is in 
France') must have the same type of neurophysiological instantiation in 
any possible mind. If that were so, we could never be justified in attribut-
ing mental states to any creature unless we were confident that its neu-
rophysiological make-up was identical to ours. And that seems an 
excessive requirement, since we are prepared to consider the possibility 
of creatures that have a mind despite their respective biology being quite 
different from ours. 
This difficulty is decisive to understand the appeal of functionalism in 
the contemporary philosophy of mind . Functionalism is, undoubtedly, 
the philosophical conception of mind that nowadays prevails. An essen-
tial feature of functionalist accounts of mind is to assimilate mental prop-
erties to functional properties and, by so doing, individuate them in 
terms of their causal role. This causal role is fixed by the functional 
Lheury LhaL defines the property at stake. This is best understood by 
considering, first, a nonmental case, say a brake: to be a brake is to have 
certain properties allowing a particular object to play the causal role that 
is fixed by a particular definition of 'brake' . Consider, for instance, the 
following one: 'to be an object such that, when pressed, triggers the 
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éDKXIXX_úííáon=of a mechanism that, by exercising certain force on the wheels, 
úáDKúáJ–úducÉs=the speed of a moving vehicle'. In the same way, it is supposed 
xúúWúDKúó=functionalists that 'to be in pain', ' 'to have the desire of eating an 
DKúúxDKfúé·éáÉDI=or 'to believe that Paris is the capital of France' can be defined 
IT;I\$y-appealing to their typical effects on our behaviour, given certain other 
úúXê búláÉfs=and desires. 
WXúúl}ú·f=We should notice two apparent virtues of functionalism. At first 
EEííúDêancÉI=the causal efficacy of brakes does not seem to be in tension with 
ifo· ilie fact that every physical effect has a physical causal explanation. Thus, 
ff;mental properties are vindicated as functional properties, their causal 
<ffi.cacy will be of the same kind as the causal efficacy of brakes: this 
}úusal=efficacy does not seem, at least prima facie, to be jeopardized by 
Yyú=existence of an implementing physical mechanism that is enough to 
loduce the effect. Secondly, functionalism is a conception of the 
hlind specially designed to deal with the multiple realizability of non-
úbúsác=properties, and, therefore, has no trouble accounting for this fact 
Jifi the case of mental properties. An object made of iron can satisfy the 
úzj! fúèuáêÉmÉnís=that a functional theory imposes on the property 'being a 
úNúFú· bDêakÉDI=but brakes can be made of many different kinds of material. Sim-
úfDkálaêlóI=a functional theory of mind leaves open the possibility of a mental 
XúWWDúêoéÉêíó=being realized in many different ways. 
f;;;_.;· ' The notion of 'realization' is crucial to our discussion. On a rather 
}P'..; C.onventional understanding of functionalism, a mental state is a second-
ê·gúXX_XúêdÉê=state: the state of having some other properties (say, neurophysi-
DDfWcúDfogácal=properties in the case of the human species) that play a certain 
zDK!!gXúúmsal=role. These properties constitute in each particular case the real-
XíúXfDKlwaíáon=of that mental state. Does this approach involve a commitment 
DKDIgúáXfo=what we have called 'causal physicalism'? Functionalism by itself does 
riH:riot require the physical or neurophysiotogica1 realization of mental prop-
WKWKáWú= úêíáÉsK=However, if functionalism is attractive with regard to the causal 
fWkDúffácacó=of the mental, it is just because it is connected with the princi-
;j;.; ple that mental states require material realizations. It is only after this 
)f;Yconnection that we can see functionalism as a particular version - the 
tj·. predominant one nowadays - of causal physicalism. Thus, from the view-
./point of functionalism, my being in pain here and now is fixed by my 
!úE·Dánsíaníáaíáng=here and now certain neurophysiological or physical prop-
rX erties. Functionalism takes it that in any particular case in which a 
\.": mental property is causally efficacious there is a physical realization of 
Cb his property that is causally active. Whatever the causal efficacy of the 
WKúúJ mental property may be on a particular occasion, it cannot go beyond the 
1'': causal powers of the physical or neurophysiological properties that 
'}, realize it in that particular case. Functionalism (hereafter, construed as 
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including the demand that functional properties should be physically 
realized) appears then as a special version of causal physicalism, namely, 
the version that inspires the dominant view.5 
Our attack against causal physicalism (and, hence, against function-
alism) will be relatively independent of conventional discussions about 
the best way to characterize the connection between functional proper-
ties and their respective realizations. Some aspects of this discussion 
are merely terminological. According to David Lewis, for instance, func-
tional terms can be used in two different ways. In the first one, they are 
used as nonrigid designators, so that a functional term refers to a 
number of different properties, as many as there are different 'realiza-
tions'. This sense of functional terms implies that multiple realizability 
does not constitute an interesting metaphysical phenomenon, since it is 
just the result of using the same (functional) term to designate different 
properties (i.e. the so-called 'different realizations') in disparate contexts. 
From this perspective, a functional property would not differ from what 
is usually called its 'realization'. So, if mental terms are functional terms, 
a mental predicate such as 'pain' will refer to different (neurophysiolog-
ical) properties. 
Is there any other property that might be picked out by our functional 
terms? Is there any genuine property that could be shared by all the 
realizations of a second-order property? Lewis has granted that, in the 
sense of a functional term that he calls 'diagonalized', an expression such 
as 'being in F' might be interpreted as picking out a property Q that 
would be shared, across all physically possible contexts, by all occupants 
of the causal role that is proper to 'F'.6 Nevertheless, Lewis has argued 
that Q itself cannot be causally efficacious. For, according to him, Q 
does not have causal powers of its own, apart from those of their dif-
ferent respective realizations: it is so disjunctive that it cannot fix the 
causal efficacy of any particular event. 7 At this point, his position is quite 
similar to Jaegwon Kim's. For, according to the latter, a second-order 
property is to be conceived as an enormous disjunctive set (i.e. the dis-
junction of all its possible realizations) and consequently, the causal 
powers of each instantiation of a second-order property are identical 
with those of its specific realization. Hence, functionalism seems to ulti-
mately coincide with type-identity theories, given that the phenomenon 
of multiple realizability only shows that the notion of identity has to be 
relativized to the different types of realization. So, if it happens that a 
mental property is identical with a certain neurophysiological property 
among the members of a species, this does not entail that this identity 
has to be preserved in other species. In fact, it might occur that the iden-
::;( 
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bas to be relativized to different individuals in the same species, or 
ifferent moments in the life of a given individual. 8 
:: t first sight, those philosophers who envisage functionalism as a 
úíáfác=version of type-identity theories are able to honour the causal 
Xúúcó=of mental properties, since mental types would just coincide with 
x::tophysiological types. Yet, this approach is connected with a resilient 
'=iy today. Several people have argued that functionalism may not be 
úD ío=preserve the causal efficacy of mental properties precisely because 
=a.s to be ultimately construed as a mere version of type-identity theo-
YúIDfhás=line of reasoning may be sketched as follows. Philosophers were 
ú áúlló=fascinated by the idea that the connection between functional 
perties and their 'realizations' could provide a good model for mental 
perties, just because (i) the multiple realizability of functional prop-
X ZúsI=and (ii) the apparently obvious way in which the causal efficacy 
,,,functional properties does not pose any problem to a physicalist con-
úFíúíáon=of the world. But, after some decades of functionalism as the 
':;: fuinant paradigm in the philosophy of mind, the autonomous causal 
úacó=of functional properties does not seem such an obvious thing. 
Ttake an example from Ned Block: consider the dormitive power. This 
a second-order property: the property of having some first-order prop-
fy (for instance, a certain chemical composition) that induces sleep. 
úíIW= some may object that it would be very strange indeed to consider 
%it this functional characterization helps at all to vindicate the causal 
:,'.Vers of dormativity as a second-order property, since the only causal 
wers involved here are those fixed by the chemical composition. But 
'=at goes for dormativity seems to apply to every functional property. 
, ; it seems that, following Lewis and Kim, we should envisage func-
,: nalism as a variant of type-identity theories. But, then, how could we 
'=f.kin the causal powers fixed by functional (and mental) predicates as 
erent from those of their respective realizations? In any event, we do 
9t intend to directly address this issue for now, since our main argu-
''ent against causal physicalism is independent of the position that a 
Wúcíáonalásí=could take on this controversial question. 9 
\ A functionalist has to grant causal physicalism anyway and, therefore, 
cognize that in any particular case in which a mental property is 
úusalló=efficacious, its causal efficacy is fixed by the causal efficacy of 
úêíaán=physical (neurophysiological) properties that realize it on that 
DDúêíáculaê=occasion. According to the dominant view, this is the only way 
A'which our minds may move the physical world. In the rest of this book 
I DKú=will often einploy the language of functionalism. The main reason 
ú ú íhaíI= in the present controversy, it surely constitutes the dominant 
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elaboration of that physicalist stance. Nevertheless, our arguments 
against functionalism tend to have a wider scope, since they affect every 
treatment of causal dispositions that is compatible with causal physical-
ism. For instance, if our argument against functionalism is right, it would 
trivially follow from it that we cannot give any sense to the idea that a 
determinate set ofneurophysiological properties are identical to a mental 
property. 
Whatever the difficulties that functionalism has to face, we must be 
aware that functionalism is something more than a mere token-identity 
thesis. Of course, for a functionalist, the instantiation of a certain mental 
property, here and now, is just the instantiation, here and now, of 
a certain set of nonmental (neurophysiological/physical) properties. 
Hence, functionalism insists that tokens (i.e. instances) of mental prop-
erties are identical to tokens (i.e. instances) of physical (neurophysio-
logical) properties. But it still tries to tell us an intelligible story about 
how mental and neurophysiologital types are related: mental types are 
defined by their having certain connections (they are second-order 
types) with material/physical/neurophysiological types. In fact, the 
original attraction of functionalism derives not only from its promising 
capacity to integrate the phenomenon of multiple realizability, as 
opposed to standard type-identity theories, but also from the dissatis-
faction associated with mere token-identity theories. For one could not 
escape the impression that a mere token-identity theory falls short of 
apprehending our intuitions about the causal efficacy of the mental. 
A mere token-identity theory claims that (i) any mental particular is 
a physical particular; (ii) without committing itself to any interesting 
connection between the properties they exemplify. This way one could 
vindicate mental causation without worrying about how mental and 
physical properties might interrelate. Yet, it would be a mistake to think 
that such a position is an easy, direct way of dissolving the difficulties 
we have been discussing in the previous pages. For, as the dominant view 
insists, one cannot safely dispense with the causal relevance of proper-
ties. To motivate this claim, let us consider Donald Davidson's treatment 
of mental causation, which invokes, at least prima facie, a mere token-
identity theory. 
Causal relations are, according to Davidson, 10 ontological affairs that 
hold between events, regardless of how we might choose to describe 
them or, relatedly, the properties by which we may decide to pick them 
out. 11 This means that there is no sense in which the causal efficacy of 
an event can be attributed to its mental properties; since, on this 
account, properties are not the relata of causal connections. Davidson 
defends an extreme nominalistic position: an event's 'properties' are just 
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; whatever determines that certain descriptions are true of it. Davidson 
: also thinks that every mental event is a physical event. His way of arguing 
t uiis point is commonplace in current literature: (1) mental events are 
ú=causally related to physical events; (2) causal relations among events are 
: to be governed, under some description, by strict laws; (3) only physi-
cal predicates can figure in strict laws; hence, ( 4) every event admits of 
ú=a physical description and is, therefore, a physical event. 
úWJII=f,·Prima fade, Davidson's account goes against our intuitions about 
,!: th_e causal efficacy of the mental. 12 It seems that only by recognizing 
J that events cause other events by virtue of instantiating certain proper-
i ties, can our ánúáíáons=about causal relevance ?e. at all expressed. 13 
- Mental events will surely cause other events, but it 1s not easy to grant, 
ú? úsKW=.. Davidson demands, that mental properties are to be inert as to the 
ú= deployment of such processes, since there are important intuitions about 
causal relevance which push in the opposite direction. As we realized in 
Will's story, we do not simply want to say that an event A ('The per-
ception of his father coming out of the cinema with a woman') caused 
_ KúmoíhÉê=event B ('Will's emotional upset'), but that event A having a 
úúX cÉêíaán=mental property P caused event B having another mental prop-
erty Q. One could also say that events A and B had plenty of other prop-
: erties: Will went through a number of physiological changes, the cinema 
was a particular cinema, Will's perception included other contents (the 
\,c:olour ofWill's father's jacket, the lover wearing glasses, etc.), and so on. 
DfX_Dúí=the writer rightly assumes that it is only worth mentioning those 
; properties of the events that are relevant to the causal processes at 
' stake. 
Davidson can, of course, always appeal to his nominalistic assump-
;,, tions: causal connections are ontological affairs, and properties are just 
áNDúIfáKñÉd=by our way of describing events. So, he would insist, the whole 
: question about the causal relevance of mental properties is ill formed. 
r But this move does not dissolve the problem. It seems that the idea that 
ú= causation only holds between events, no matter how they are actually 
úK dÉscêábÉdI=or the properties by which they are picked out, simply alters 
!( the way in which the worry has to be expressed: we should now talk 
:cin tenns of causal explanations. Consider, for instance, the following 
• example: 
'Something possessing content, or having meaning, can be a cause without 
its possessing that content or having that meaning being at all relevant to 
its causal powers .. A soprano>s upper-register supplications may shatter a 
glass, but their meaning is irrelevant to their having this effect. Their effect 
on the glass would be the same if they meant nothing at all or something 
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entirely different .... If brain structures possessing meaning affect motor 
output in the way the soprano's acoustic productions affect glass, then the 
meaning of these neural structures is causally inert. Even if it is there, it 
doesn't do anything.' 14 
Faced with this kind of reflection, we cannot confine ourselves to 
repeating that properties have no causal import, that there are no such 
things as causally relevant properties. The crucial issue is that, with 
regard to the shattering of the glass, there is a pertinent difference 
between the content of the aria and its pitch. We may express this dif-
ference, if we wish, in terms of causal explanation: to explain the shat-
tering, we can rightly appeal to the pitch, but not to the content of the 
aria. The pitch description is explanatorily relevant, while the content 
description is not. The question is now: why should the content of a 
mental state (say, the desire to drink a beer) not be as irrelevant with 
regard to certain physical movements (say, the action of walking towards 
the fridge) as the content of the aria with respect to the shattering of the 
glass? 
Davidson certainly tried to address this issue by granting a minimal 
sense in which physical properties (descriptions) are more basic than 
other properties. According to him, any nonphysical difference between 
events requires a physical difference. 15 So, he could argue that, if the 
event 'Will's perception of his father's lover' had been different in its 
mental properties, it would have been a different event and, therefore, 
it would have been different in its physical properties. But, even if this 
might be the beginning of the story, it cannot be the whole of it. For, 
on this line of reasoning, we should also say that if the content of the 
song had been different, the physical properties of the singing would had 
been different and the content of the song should, correspondingly, be 
judged relevant to the shattering of the glass. And this is not correct. For 
we still have the intuition that, in the circumstances of Dretsk,e's 
example, the following counterfactual is false: 
Had the song had a different content, the glass would not have been 
shattered. 
While it is true that if the song had had a much lower pitch, the glass 
would not have been shattered. 
To couch our point in a language keener to Davidson, we could say 
that our causal-explanatory judgements about the relevance of the 
content and the pitch in our song's ability-to-shatter glass, seem to pre-
suppose that an event A with a completely different content and the same 
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:. __ pitch would have shattered the glass as well, while an event B with the 
ú=same 'content and a 1nuch lower pitch would not have shattered it. The 
. important lesson to be learned at this stage is not whether Davidson,s 
: ·approach can actually make sense of the truth of these counterfactuals, 
úúJwháchI=as Dretske>s example suggests, seem to express our intuitions 
ú!abouí= the distinct causal-explanatory relevance of the properties 
t involved in events A and B. This is an issue that we will extensively treat 
I in Chapter 5. Our main point now is simply that, in order to make sense 
l of our intuitions about the truth-values of those counterfactuals, we need 
I 
to go beyond the mere acceptance of a token-identity theory. The fact 
t that a certain particular instantiates both a mental property and a physi-
l cal property cannot by itself vindicate the causal (or causally explana-
!. J úMêóF=relevance of the former. 
' Before moving on to put forward the metaphysical motivation for 
causal physicalism, let>s briefly justify a few terminological options. It 
i ,may be clear by now that it is not a mere accident that, when talking 
1 about the causal relevance of n1ind, most people assume that the crucial 
issue is the causal relevance of mental properties. What matters is not 
i merely the causal relevance of mental particulars, but the efficacy of 
ú= those particulars in virtue of the mental properties that they instantiate. 
ú=
t,;Jln everyday talk, we speak of mental events, mental processes, mental 
. states, mental phenomena, mental occurrences, or mental facts. N othing 
ú= in our main argument will hang on choosing any of these expressions. 
;; When we should talk about 'events', we will assume a conception of 
f eiVents as articulated particulars: a conception according to which some 
f properties of an event - namely, those that are essential to (or constitu-
: tive of) the event - are its causally relevant properties. On this termi-
f"nological option, the philosophical perplexity about the causal relevance 
úÉf=the mind can surely be expressed by asking about the causal relevance 
i of mental events. And this kind of talk would be entirely compatible with 
le the conviction that the crucial issue is the causal relevance of the mental 
properties that constitute those events. 
· '"' By accepting that the causal efficacy of the mind amounts to the 
causal efficacy of mental properties, we are conceding that causal con-
nections hold in virtue of the tokening of certain properties. We come 
.from seeing that even this minimal assumption is not uncontroversial, 
·since Davidson has linked his conception of events as unarticulated par-
ticulars to a conception of causation and properties in which no ques-
tion can be meaningfully asked about the causal relevance of properties. 
)."et we have provided some motivation to retain that assumption, at least in the context of our challenge to the dominant view. First, because most 
philosophers who enter the contemporary debate on mental causation 
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regard the causal efficacy of mental properties as the crucial issue and, 
consequently, we can claim that the Davidsonian conception of proper-
ties is not part of the dominant view. Secondly, we have seen that no 
interesting issue is answered by shifting from the causal relevance of 
properties to the explanatory relevance of certain descriptions of events. 
And last but not least: we hope that the connection between our criti-
cism to the dominant view and the Davidsonian conception of causa-
tion and properties should become clear in later chapters of this book. 
For, if our arguments in those chapters are correct, causation cannot be 
a connection between unstructured particulars fully independent of the 
properties that those particulars do instantiate. But, for the moment, let 
us focus on the metaphysical motivation for causal physicalism and, in 
relation, for the demand that functional properties should have a physi-
cal realization. 
2 The Causal Closure of the Physical World and 
Explanatory Exclusion 
In an initial reflection about what our metaphysical images are, every-
one may be strongly inclined to concede that a physical mechanism 
must underlie any change that the world actually undergoes. We saw how 
this image emerged as we raised the case against substantial dualism, or 
as we couldn't help asking for the physiological mechanisms that inter-
vened in Will's perceptions, thoughts and actions. Had some physical 
mechanism not been present, nothing would have happened at all. It 
seems that we cannot accept the existence of a change in the world 
without the corresponding changes in the physical properties of it. 
But this is just an image. We need to define it in more refined terms. 
Specifically, what is the precise content that the dominant view attaches 
to this image? A proper answer will require some elaboration, and the 
job will only be accomplished by the end of section 4. Let us propose 
the following principle as a start: 
Physical Closure: Every physical event has a complete causal expla-
nation in physical terms. 
This principle is often claimed to apprehend a central portion of 
our metaphysical intuitions concerning the relevance of the physical. 16 
Suppose, now, that there occurs for John an event c with a certain 
content property M, and c's having property M causes an event e having 
property B. 17 The physical closure of the world implies that there 
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úú also=be an event c* with a neurophysiological property N which 
WúÉs=event e having property B. For the sake of siinplicity, we can safely 
>me that c == c*, since this will not affect the discussion. We have, 
\ two causal chains: 
( 1) c's having M causes e's having B 
(2) c,s having N caust:s t!'s having B 
us, all that Physical Closure demands is that, for each causal chain 
class (1), there must be a causal chain of class (2). We should now 
··:'sider how these two causal chains interrelate. Are we prepared to 
jfoede that e's having B may have two alternative causal explanations? 
: is true that different partial causes of the same effect are often 1nen-
\dned. The problem is, however, 
·ú ·bñélanaíoêó=Exclusion, i.e. that ' ... Two or more complete and 
,{. independent explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot 
úúm[=. :. . coexist'. 
18 
EúDWíúKbêI=to put it in another way, 'No event can have more than one com-
úáDúúlÉíÉ=and independent explanation.' 19 Some seeming counterexamples 
úfgfo= this principle are not actually so because, as one easily realizes on 
úúEúúúcond=thought, they do not really deal with either complete or entirely 
it§Jndependent explanations of a single explanandum. 2° For example, we 
;;(;:could say that Will's going to the cinema that afternoon caused his 
·nWyúmoíáonal=upset, since if Will had not been to the cinema on such an 
DX!·úúDoccasáonI=he would not have been distressed. Nevertheless, this new 
Wgú?Éñélanaíáon=is both partial and interdependent with the previous expla-
··D:nation, which mentions his meeting his father with a lover. Will's going 
Fú K ío=the cinema is not a sufficient condition for his getting emotionally 
}i upset. Thus, we see that two accounts of a single event may pick out two 
\ distinct causes. But, in such cases, both causes will probably be just two 
', partial or interdependent causes of the event, even if each explanation 
singles out one of them as the most salient. 
There is, however, another kind of counterexample to Explanatory 
Exclusion, namely, those cases in which it could be rightly argued that 
two different, complete and independent causal chains do overdetermine 
their effect: two bullets killing a man at the very same time, two darts 
simultaneously exploding a balloon. But what should we say about these 
cases? Does overdetermination actually conflict with Explanatory Exclu-
sion? To answer this question, let's turn to Kim's influential treatment 
of Explanatory Exclusion. 
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To begin, we should say that Kim does not provide a systematic char-
acterization of either what should count as a complete explanation or 
when two explanations should be judged independent. He explicitly 
trusts that these notions should be satisfactorily elucidated through the 
consideration of various prima fade uncontroversial cases,;21 and a first 
suggestion that these cases bring repeatedly to light is that a c01nplete 
explanation must mention a sufficient cause of the explanandum. In this 
respect, complete explanations would oppose to partial explanations 
(and, therefore, to partial causes) where 'only a part, perhaps an indis-
pensable part, of a sufficient cause,22 is mentioned. Yet, some further 
elucidation is required to apprehend the notion of complete cause 
which complete explanations presuppose and, in relation, the special role 
reserved for cases of overdetermination. 
The balloon explodes because it is simultaneously hit by two darts. 
Here we have an effect E and two seemingly independent causes C and 
C*, such that E would have still exploded even if either C or C* had not 
occurred. In this situation, both C and C* appear as sufficient causes of 
E, and they seem to constitute two independent and complete explana-
tions of the same event. Thus construed, we must accept that overdeter-
mination cases are just an exception to Explanatory Exclusion and, as 
Kim intimates, one might be forced to 'exempt all overdeterminative cases 
from the requirement of Explanatory Exclusion>.23 Nevertheless, Kim · 
presumes that this exemption does not constitute a serious problem for 
Explanatory Exclusion, since most people take for granted that overde-
termination does not abound in nature, that cases of overdetermination 
must be quite rare and exceptional. In fact, Explanatory Exclusion may 
be conceived as a way of expressing the latter metaphysical assumption. 
There is a widespread consensus in current literature that overdeter-
mining causes cannot abound; but there is not so much agreement about 
how this metaphysical fact should be explained. Many philosophers 
reject as sheer absurdity that overdetermination could be a general 
feature of causation. 24 Moreover, some of them have associated, as we · 
shall see, the rarity of overdetermined effects with the very concept of 
cause, since they envisage the direction of causation as metaphysically 
linked to the asymmetry in overdetermination, that is, to the fact that 
causes do not overdetermine their effects while effects do overdetermine 
their causes. Be it as it may, the rejection of overdetermination, at least 
the denial that overdetermination could be a general feature of causa-
tion, plays a crucial role in the standard physicalist argument about 
mental causation. In fact, we are happy to accept that causes are indi-
viduated so that massive overdctermination is excluded. The problem is 
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r that, if our later arguments are right, the dominant view will be unable 
ú= not only to justify, but also to respect this metaphysical conviction. In 
. _ any event, the dominant attitude towards overdetermination imposes a 
I further requirement on complete causes. Complete causes must not only Wúbf=,sufficient for their effects but also (insofar as ?vÉêdÉíÉêúánaKíáon=has úêM=be excluded) necessary for them. So the dommant phys1cahst argu-i' ment takes for granted that n1ost causal processes (namely, those where 
- overdetermination is avoided) require the existence of causal chains sat-
' t,. 
isfying the following constraints: 
they must be sufficient causes for their effects, that is, they must 
determine their effects or, to avoid any commitment to deter-
minism, the chances of their effects. 25 
And, in the circumstances, this· sufficient cause must also be nec-
essary for the effect and, consequently, every component of the 
complete cause must be necessary for the effect. In other words, 
it must be true that, in the circumstances, the effect would have 
not been produced if any element of the complete cause had 
been absent. 
úDKuêúXágWkowI=we are in a position to examine how causal chains (1) and (2) 
·ih'terrelate. If overdetermination is to be conceived as rather exceptional, 
then it is clear that cases of mental causation could hardly be viewed as 
generally overdetermined, and Explanatory Exclusion is of application. 
- It follows then that c's having content property M and c's having neural 
property N cannot constitute two independent complete causes of e's 
having B. As a result, we cannot envisage (1) and (2) as two indepen-
4ent explanations. Moreover,, Physical Closure emphasizes that (2) must 
'''e: true> that is,, it must be true of some N that c's having N causally 
Wúñélaáns=e's having B. 
Hence, we are forced to say that e's having B would have occurred 
even if c's having M didn't, unless the latter was dependent on c's having 
N. Hence,, if c's having M is conceived as independent of c's having N, 
then c's having M is bound to be causally inert, since Explanatory Exclu-
úí= sion (together with Physical Closure) precludes the existence of such an 
úIX álldÉéÉndÉní=causal chain. Consequently, if the mental properties of an 
úNáINIÉvÉní=are to escape epiphenomenalism, they must depend on its physi-
(,_''. cal properties. 
It might be argued against the previous line of reasoning that chains 
(1) and (2) do not adequately describe those situations where mental 
causation is actually involved. Thus, some people would point out that, 
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as we can distinguish in c two properties, namely, a neural property N 
and a content property M, we can also discriminate in e two properties, 
that is, a behavioural property B and an intentional property I. So the 
explananda of both explanations must be different: the neurophysiolog-
ical state of my brain explains that my arm rises, while the inental prop-
erty explains that I (intentionally) raise my arm.26 Consequently, we 
would obtain the two following causal chains: 
Case II: (1 *) 
(2) 
c's having M causes e's having I 
c's having N causes e's having B 
Chains (1 *) and (2) certainly have two distinct explananda whereby 
they remain unaffected by Explanatory Exclusion. Hence, it sounds as 
if, by splitting the explanandum, we could obtain causal efficacy for 
the mental properties of an event without dependence upon its physical 
properties. 
The trouble with splitting the explanandum seems to be that this 
strategy either leads to epiphenomenalism or simply postpones the ques-
tion. To put it in a nutshell, if epiphenomenalism is to be avoided, Case 
II is only apparently different from Case I. Either we assume that c's 
having M causally interacts with the physical world, or we assume it · 
does not interact. On the latter horn, we are being committed to a strong 
version of dualism which rules out mind-body interaction and is, there-
fore, incapable of accounting for our most manifest intuitions. An ini-
tially more sensible version of dualism should concede, on the contrary, 
that c's having M interacts with the physical world. But, in that case, 
c's having M 1nust be the cause of another event e*'s having a certain 
physical property B, which also has a physical cause. Thus, in our 
example, the mental chain: 
(1 *) c's having M causes e's having I 
requires the development of a causal chain: 
(1 **) c's having M causes e*'s having B. 
Hence, to honour Physical Closure, ( 1 **) entails that there must be a 
neural property N such that: 
(2**) c's having N causes e*'s having B. 
./ 
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tcausal chains (1 **)and (2**) constitute a Case I. For a causal phys-
Tist, then, every Case II presupposes a Case I. Hence, we can still 
úíaán=the thesis that a causal physicalist will only be able to recognize 
b causal efficacy of 'c>s having M, if it depends on 'c's having N,. Con-
úuÉnílóI=it seems that the only way in which a causal physicalist may 
cognize the efficacy of mental properties is by accepting the depen-
úNNcÉ=of those properties upon physical properties. This represents a first 
D úé=in the process of elucidating what, in the light of the dominant 
únÉÉI= the physicalist constraints are for a property to be causally 
· cacious. Strong Supervenience constitutes the second step. 
Strong Supervenience 
f he dependence of c's having content property M upon c>s having 
úúuêal=property N is, according to the dominant view, the only way to 
pi·eserve the causal efficacy of the former. This remark must, then, be 
úúkÉn=as the first contribution of the dominant view to our initial ques-
don about how WilPs mental processes interrelate with the correspond-
i:hg underlying physical mechanisms. It seems that, once the basicness 
.gf the physical process is assumed, mental properties will only turn 
.cfot to be efficacious if they are adequately dependent upon the 
ú·úoêêÉséondáng=physical/neurophysiological properties. We need now to 
¥xamine how the dominant view scrutinizes these metaphysical images 
<Jn order to determine how strong such dependence should be. This 
Xáúñamánaíáon=will lead us to formulate Strong Supervenience, as a prin-
' Ciple in which, according to the dominant picture, a significant part of 
·Wúuê=physicalist intuitions coalesce . 
. /:' Identity is the most extreme form of dependence, but goes beyond 
'Mwhat is required. Although an object's having the property 'being a car-
. :,:burettor, depends on its having certain physical properties, 'being a car-
\i/; burettor> is not identical with such a set of physical properties. Since 
Xú]X anoíhÉê=object, with quite different physical properties, might still 
NWáúDWD=possess the property 'being a carburettor'. And, prima fade, this situa-
ú!xú{W=tion causes no physicalist strain. What this suggests is that all we should 
1:iX expect is a unidirectional kind of dependence: the tokening of some 
::{\ physical properties being a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for 
úlúá= the tokening of 'being a carburettor'. It could, then, be said that the 
('} possession by an object of the property 'being a carburettor' supervenes 
áú·W= upon the possession by that object of a given set of physical properties. 
fú= Derivatively, this set of physical properties will constitute, in that 
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object, the supervenience base of its possessmg the property 'being a 
carburettor'. 
Nevertheless, this is still too vague, since, as defined, the superve-
nience relation admits of distinct degrees of strength, not all of them 
equally acceptable for a causal physicalist. In order to determine the 
strength that, according to the dominant view, actually fits our physi-
calist intuitions; let us consider, following Kim, three modes of super-
venience: Weak, Strong, and Global Supervenience. 
úak=Supervenience has to do with the idea of mere asymmetric covari-
ation which, as we shall see, fails to grasp the required kind of depen-
dence. So, being 'A' and 'B' names of different families of properties: 
'A wÉakúó=supervenes on B if and only if necessarily for any property Fin 
A, if an object x has F, then there exists a property G in B such that x has 
G, and if any y has Git has F.'27 
It is worth stressing that the sort of supervenience relation that Weak 
Supervenience contemplates is not valid across possible worlds, but only 
relative to a particular world. As a result, it is obviously compatible with 
Weak Supervenience that, for instance, in world w(l), mental property 
M(l) should supervene on physical property P, while, in other worlds 
w(i), an entirely different mental property M (i) should supervene on the' 
same physical property P. And this might apply to all the physical and 
mental properties of any given world. This upshot is most dissatisfying, 
since we do find these possibilities metaphysically perverse. In fact the 
previous arguments about the dependence between mental and physical 
explanations seem to require a more robust link. 
To illustrate the point, take the functional property of 'being a spark-
ing plug'. We are prepared to explain causally some features of 
a car's behaviour by the ignition of its sparking plugs. We view 'being a 
sparking plug' as a causally efficacious property, as picking up a cluster 
of causal powers. Now the question is: could this cluster of causal powers 
be possessed by the object in world w(l), but not by its physical coun-
terpart in world w(2)? If 'being a sparking plug' were just weakly super-
venient upon the physical properties of an object, then the answer ought 
to be affirmative. Yet, according to the dominant view, our metaphysical 
intuitions appear to impose the opposite response: it could not be so. If 
an object has the cluster of causal powers that individuate the property 
'being a sparking plug', it must have this cluster of causal powers across 
all physically, or nomologically, possible worlds, that is, across all possi-
ble worlds in which the laws of nature hold.28 
.··: 
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)"It seems, in any event, that the sort of dependence we are looking for 
butd include asymmetric covariation, not only relative to a possible 
;dd, but also across all physically possible worlds. This is the sort of 
Hpendence upon the physical that seems to be exemplified by an 
:'ject's possession of properties such as 'being a sparking plug' or 'being 
carburettor'' or by biological properties like 'being a chromosome' or 
yXúáng=an enzyme'. This way we shift fro1n weak to Strong Supervenience 
Ffiereby we úêÉ=bound to add a second 'necessarily' (i.e. valid across all 
bssible worlds) to the previous definition. So again, being 'A' and 'B' 
DúmÉs=for different sets of properties: 
';"A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each 
L property F in A, if x has F, then there is a property G in b such that x has 
}G, and necessarily if any y has G, it has F.'29 
WWú qhás=definition can also be construed as stating a physicalist condi-
:&n for the causal relevance of properties, when properties B are the 
:nd of properties that are recognized as 'physical'. It is to this physi-
Dúeásí=constraint that 'Strong Supervenience' will now refer. 
XúúX= Strong Supervenience appears to pick up the sort of dependence that 
the con1bination of Physical Closure and Explanatory Exclusion was 
Aúeáng=for. Consequently, if the causal efficacy of mental properties is to 
:6,e consistent with our supposed physicalist intuitions, the mental prop-
' hies of a system must strongly supervene upon its physical properties. 
None the less, some people feel reluctant to concede Strong Superve-
hience because they think that, for the effect of apprehending how the 
'physical and the mental interrelate, a less demanding kind of super-
yenience will do. To this end, Global Supervenience is elaborated, and 
e'merges as the physicalist constraint that the following definition 
WúñéêÉssÉsI=when 'B' stands for physical properties: 
J 'A globally supervenes on B just in case worlds that are ándáscÉênáblúMwáíh=l' respect to B ("B-indiscernible", for short) are also A-indiscernible. 
j Undoubtedly, Global Supervenience captures part of our metaphys-
)ical intuitions. Two physically indistinguishable worlds ought to share all 
';their mental, moral, aesthetic properties. But this falls short of what is 
i·equired, since Global Supervenience is consistent with a number of 
J counterintuitive situations. 
,X/ Firstly, Global Supervenience does not rule out the possibility of two 
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nevertheless, having no mental property in common: one of these worlds 
including, for instance, consciousness, but not the other.31 Secondly, in 
the very same world, two physically identical individuals might possess 
entirely distinct mental properties. 32 What these possibilities suggest 
is that Global Supervcnience does not succeed in capturing the sort .:i 
of dependence that Physical Closure, in combination with Explanatory 
Exclusion, demands. Furthermore, Kim stresses that Global Superve-
nience without Strong Supervenience becomes a 'brute and unexplain-
able fact'. How could two physically indistinguishable worlds be 
indistinguishable in every other aspect if not by the existence of more 
particular connections, of the sort postulated by Strong Supervenience, 
between the physical and the rest of the properties of the world? Thus, 
'if, as Strong Supervenience affirms, there should exist appropriate con- '. 
nections between specific psychological properties of objects and their 
physical properties, that would give us a basis for an explanation.'33 
To sum up, Weak and Global Supervenience apparently fail to grasp 
the sort of dependence involved in Physical Closure (once Explanatory 
Exclusion is granted). For they allow for situations that seem to violate 
certain metaphysical intuitions; only Strong Supervenience appears, on 
the dominant stance, as an appropriate elucidation of such intuitions. To 
get a clearer picture of the dominant view, we need to explore some , 
further physicalist principles, which are closely associated with the pre- · 
vious considerations. This is what we purport to do in the next section, 
while in the final section we plan to consider why mental properties may 
be at pains to satisfy these physicalist demands. 
4 Narrowness and Minimality "'J 
The dominant view tends to see in Strong Supervenience a fairly ade-
quate expression of the physicalist intuitions which derive from Physi-
cal Closure and Explanatory Exclusion. These reflections rely, though, 
on a certain understanding of what a physical property is. Section 4.1 
elucidates this notion, where we bring out the ties that Strong Superve-
nience bears with two other physicalist constraints, namely: Intrinsicness 
and Narrowness. This will improve our understanding of the physicalist · 
requirements that the dominant view commonly emphasizes. Yet, in 
section 4.2, we will argue that Physical Closure and Explanatory Exclu-
sion entail a more demanding physicalist constraint, which, despite being 
crucial, goes generally unnoticed: 'Minimality' is the word that we will 
reserve for it. In fact, we will close by claiming that the causal physical-
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bound to recognize that only those nonbasic properties that satisfy 
Narrowness and Minimality maú=count as causally efficacious. 
Wyú= Physical properties: Intrinsicness and Narrowness 
rirst sight, one might claim that history and context are causally irrel-
i1t unless they have left some trace in the present state of affairs. We 
n explain a teenager's aggressive behaviour by the hard circum-
"ilces in which she has been raised. We can report those circumstances 
::Tuding numerous details, indicating particular persons, actions, and 
'ces. But all these historical considerations would be utterly irrelevant 
'm the viewpoint of explaining the teenager,s behaviour, if we did not 
'ume that they have transformed her personality in a certain way, and 
°' a lasting, specific mark in her brain. Environments of different kinds 
úó=foster a similar aggressive behaviour in children, while distinct chil-
,en may react differently in the same kind of environment. It seems, 
en, that what accounts for the current hostile or friendly behaviour of 
.. 
;.teenager are not the hardships or benevolence of the environment 
here she was actually brought up, but the way her personality has been 
ftered by that environment and, in terms of the causal physicalist, the 
\1d of neurological structure that repeated exposure to a certain envi-
Bhment has wired in her brain. 
? What are, however, the intuitions about physical properties and 
Jusation that render these remarks plausible? Let us begin by con-
'iclering our intuitions about the behaviour of two physical duplicates 
.\ and B. It seems clear that, for a spatiotemporal context C which fixes 
. · ·· e possession of a property P by A, it is true that had B been placed 
áú=the same context as A, then B would also have had property P. This 
irituition is so undemanding that it holds even when property P is a rela-
úonal=property, e.g. 'having had a headache yesterday'. For it is true that, 
{f B had been in A's place, in the context C which fixes the possession 
l:)y A of the property 'having had a headache yesterday', then B would 
úlso=have had this property, since context C would only fix the posses-
gúáon=by A of the property at stake if it should include what occurred to 
úffKsA=yesterday. 
úbFy= The previous considerations suggest a sort of Substitutivity Test for 
lúhósácal=twins: 
úúc= For any property P and any pair of physical twins x and y, it is true ú}DKLK= that, when x is in a physically possible context that fixes t11at x 
úB·[K= úK=P, had y been in that context instead of x, y would also have had 
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When people stress the basic character of physical properties, they 
may be simply claiming that physical twins (i.e. twins regarding physi-
cal properties) do pass this Substitutivity Test. In fact, only if physical 
properties are defined in terms of this test, several physicalist intuitions 
proclaimed by the dominant view will come into focus. Accordingly, 
we can say that the idea that physical properties are basic presupposes 
that: 
A basic property is a property that belongs to the minimal subset B 
of the properties of the world that satisfies the following requirement: 
every two objects that share all their B properties pass the Substitu-
tivity Test. 
The idea that physical properties are basic in this sense seems to be 
equivalent to the principle of Physical Closure. First, it seems true that 
if we should dismiss Physical Closure, we ought to abandon the idea that 
physical properties are basic. For the denial of Physical Closure entails 
(i) that there might be some physical effect that could not be completely 
explained by its physical antecedent. And this appears to entail (ii) that, 
sometimes at least, when a physical property is instantiated, the whole 
physical context is not able to fix the effect or, at least, the objective 
chances of it. Consequently, it sounds that the totality of the instanti- · 
ated physical properties is unable to fix all causally relevant properties. 
And this counts, by definition, as a straight refusal of the basic charac-
ter of physical properties. 34 
Conversely, Physical Closure seems to entail the basic character of 
physical properties. Ifwe should repudiate this basic character, we would 
have to drop Physical Closure with regard to those properties that are 
able to affect the physical world. If physical properties were not basic, ' 
then it might be possible that certain causal powers were not fixed by 
the instantiated physical properties and their physical contexts. As a 
result, certain differential effects could not be accounted for in terms of 
physical differences. But those effects may be physical or nonphysical. If 
they were physical, such a situation would amount to a straightforward 
rejection of Physical Closure. If, on the contrary, the effects in question 
were not physical, they must, ex hypothesi, be able to have physical 
effects. Then the previous argument applies. 
At the beginning of this chapter, we made an initial concession to the 
causal physicalist, namely: there is an intelligible notion of physical prop-
erty. And, coherently, we renounced asking for a clear specification of 
what those properties could be. Now we are prepared to make a related 
Physicalism and the Mental 27 
:\. 
dession. We arc prepared to grant that the notion of basic property 
t'frntroduced in terms of the Substitutivity Test can identify the rele-
b: class of 'physical' properties. Some could, indeed, object that by 
hting this we are being by far too generous, since we are conceding, 
'itistance, that there is an interesting subset of properties that satisfies 
)definition of 'basic property', and that the components of such a 
úÉí=arc fixed by the truth of an ideal basic science of nature, namely, 
_WúácsK=In other words, we are allowing the causal physicalist to assume 
t': a stipulation about basic physical properties bears some relevant 
\ . with the methodological principles and the empirical findings of 
·sics, and this is certainly a rather liberal concession. 
:rt_ fact, the definition of a basic property can only be of some help to 
Púal=physicalism if it generates a small and interesting enough subset 
F could fit certain previous intuitions. Given that nobody even 
ef.mpts to provide a list of properties that would possess the meta-
.,sical virtues that the dominant view ascribes to physical properties, 
úfounds=fair enough to stipulate simply that physical properties are 
i úÉ=that could satisfy the relevant metaphysical requirements (that is, 
Ing basic in the sense just explained). This stipulation does not exclude 
L).itself that every predicate would refer to a different basic property 
d, thereby, the risk of emptiness is manifest. If causal physicalists are 
3favoid this risk, they must be relying on a further assumption, namely: 
)1t the set of basic properties (i.e. the set of properties that meet the 
'pulation at stake) has to be interesting enough or, in other words, has 
.i be fixed by a very small subset of our predicates, say, the predicates 
ú§Éd=in basic science explanations. 
h/ So, the point has to be that there must be a small subset of proper-
ús=that satisfy the aforementioned stipulation and that might be fixed 
\ terms of something like the causally relevant properties of an ideal 
·úsác=science. The problem is that scientific explanation seems to be nec-
_(!Ssarily concerned with the idea of attributing identity of causal powers J'b different states of systems. It is not by accident, for instance, that 
physics books accept as explanatory, as causally relevant, properties 
úhách=allow for several different realizations in terms of other, more fun-
}damental properties. Consider, for instance, the following paradigmatic 
example of physical explanation: the correlation between variations in 
Jhe pressure in an ideal gas and variations in its temperature. The law 
that fixes this correlation (Boyle's law) does not explain the individual 
{behaviour of any given particle, but the overall effect on the pressure 
{variable that is produced by altering the temperature variable.35 If some 
i(would say that, as a result, Boyle's law cannot be a basic law of nature, 
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then we would be at trouble to understand what could be the form of 
the basic science of nature.36 
A different, more sensible possibility would be to construe the notion i 
of 'basic property' as relative. Thus, the set of, say, neurophysiological 
properties could be basic with regard to the set of, say, mental proper-
ties; even if there could be a third set of properties that would count as 
basic with respect to neurophysiology. Thus, at any stage, the scientific 
enterprise could then appeal to the causal efficacy of states that are mul- •'· 
tiply realizable in terms of other properties. Moreover, on this relative 
notion of basic property, all the previous physicalist arguments for the 
primacy of neurophysiological states in mental causation could still 
retain their force. We would not need, then, the idea of a basic science 
of nature that only appeals to the causal efficacy of the most basic prop-
erties of the world. 
In any event, our challenge to causal physicalism will not focus on 
this kind of worry, since, for the sake of argument, we are ready to grant 
that the causal physicalist would eventually yield satisfactory examples 
of basic properties. When we shall consider some putative examples of 
dependence of functional and mental properties upon more basic prop-
erties, we will present as relevantly basic the kinds of properties that 
the dominant view accepts as such: force, mass, shape, electrical pat-
terns, neurophysiological patterns, and so on. We will analyse those · 
cases without discussing the connection that those relatively basic prop- . 
erties bear to the putatively ultimate basic properties of the world. It is 
clear, however, that, by calling into question the physicalist assumptions 
about the link between, say, mental and neural properties, we are ipso 
facto attacking a physicalist understanding of the link between any other 
kind of property and the putatively ultimate basic properties of the 
world. 
Be that as it may, it is important to highlight that the dominant view 
tends to consider that a relevant metaphysical principle follows from the 
previous stipulation of physical properties as basic, namely: 
Intrinsicness: Two objects that share all their intrinsic physical prop-
erties must also have in common all their causal powers across all 
nomologically possible contexts. 
This principle could also be stated in terms of Strong Supervenience. 
According to Intrinsicness, any causal power of an object is necessarily 
preserved by any of its physical duplicates. So, there cannot be any dif-
ference in causal powers without a difference in the (intrinsic) physical 
properties of the objects at stake. To put it another way, suppose that 
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úí=A is in a context C which fixes the possession by this object 
particular property P. We may say that, in this context, object A has 
}rty P. Now consider a physical 'duplicate B. Since by definition 
foal properties pass the Substitutivity Test, it follows that object B 
;;,;,the ability to acquire property P if placed in context C. Of course, 
{/ability is something that A and B share, independently of their actual 
íúêó=or location. What the dominant view judges is that those abili-
;;·i shared across all physically possible contexts, causally explain the 
llisition, in a particular context, of some conditional causal powers. 
úÉms=then that those abilities fixed as basic by the Substitutivity Test 
_;'themselves causal powers that an object would preserve across all 
\·$.ically possible contexts and, therefore, Intrinsicness ought to be 
>· owledged. 
'his transition is usually taken for granted by causal physicalists; yet, 
intend to argue that it does not hold. For the transition in question 
ies on some apparently elementary intuitions about causality and 
' ianation which, if we are right, will turn out to be quite inappropri-
\ It is commonplace, within the dominant view, to mention Stephen 
úáchDs=remarks to the purpose that the principle of substitutivity directly 
;tails the intrinsicness of causal powers.37 At first sight, this move can 
WúDaídló=be objected, insofar as it uses a notion of 'power' that can be legit-
úBíÉló=derived from the everyday meaning of the word. It is obvious 
· IW úíI=insofar as a pair of physical twins would respect the Substitutivity 
... st, they have the following 'power' : each of them would act as the other 
tually docs if it were placed in the context in which the other is actu-
)y placed. However, it does not follow, and this will be our main objec-
&n, that this 'power' is a causal power or, in other words, that the 
''.:punte1factual that expresses that 'power' should really count as a causal 
:.ounterfactual. 
K XKúi= It is important to notice that we are not asking for a reductive account 
()f. the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Of course, 
this is something that the dominant view has not provided.38 And it is 
rbt by accident that no philosopher has succeeded in such an enterprise . 
. et, some previous intuitive conception of that distinction is required if 
Intrinsicness is to be at all an intelligible principle. In everyday life, we 
}do seem to have little problem in drawing the required distinction. The 
úhaéÉ=of a key is an intrinsic property of it, while its being placed on my 
ifable does not count as an intrinsic property of the key. There is a 
':number of alternative ways of expressing this intuition. We could thus 
that intrinsic properties depend on the constitution of the thing itself, 
independently of the properties of any other object. But we could also 
insist that intrinsic properties are preserved by perfect duplicates of the 
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thing at stake or, alternatively, that a change in the intrinsic properties 
is a real change in the object, since a change in the shape is a change in 
the key, but its change of position on the table does not represent a 
change in the key. The fact that we change the position of the key does 
not change the key itself. However powerful these remarks may sound, 
it is quite clear that they rely on a circle of closely interconnected 
notions, and there is little hope that any of them would help to provide 
ii 
a reductive account of the rest. Perfect duplicates are just objects that 
share all their intrinsic properties. To say that certain facts about an 
object are independent of any other thing amounts to claiming that those 
facts are fixed by the intrinsic properties of the object in question. A real 
change in an object is simply a change that does not require any varia-
tion in the facts about things that are independent of the object. By , 
rehearsing this circularity, we are not at all suggesting that there is some-
thing wrong in these everyday distinctions; still it may serve as a warning 
against certain metaphysical moves that (like those of the causal physi-
calist) take for granted that such everyday distinctions can be safely pro-
jected onto much more complex situations, without a proper assessment 
of the conditions under which these distinctions become intelligible in 
our everyday life. 
Be it as it may, Intrinsicness seems to impose a certain interpretation " 
of what a non-intrinsic causally efficacious property has to be. Take, 
for example, the property of 'weighing half a kilogram', which is a 
relational property of a book Q: a physical twin of book Q in a different 
gravitational context would have another weight. What seems indis-
putable, though, is that this extrinsic property is detennined by the 
basic properties of the book and the basic properties of the context 
in which book Q is placed. A physical duplicate of Q and a physical 
duplicate of the gravitational context in which book Q is placed would 
fix the very same weight for the book. Furthermore, it seems clear that 
the book's property 'having a weight of half a kilogram', which is rela-
tional regarding book Q to which we apply the predicate 'heavy', may 
be intrinsic with respect to a larger system that should encompass both 
book Q and the corresponding gravitational field. For a relational prop-
erty R of Q must strongly supervene upon the basic properties of 
a broader system. From this perspective, the distinction between extrin-
sic or relational and intrinsic or internal properties can hardly be con-
strued as a distinction be tween types of properties,, since the cluster 
of causal powers that any property picks up may appear as either extrin-
sic or intrinsic,, depending on how the bearer of such causal powevs is 
individuated.39 
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In any case) what Intrinsicness demands is that there must be a 
specific way in which Q contributes to the tokening of R within a larger 
. system. The ability to contribute in a certain way can be envisaged as an 
intrinsic property of an object Q, and what fixes this contribution is the 
narrow correlate of the relational property R in object Q) which can then 
, ·. 'e\defined as: 
the specific way in which the basic properties of object Q contribute 
to the tokening of relational property R in the relevant context. 
So, to follow up our example, we could say that an object's mass is 
an intrinsic property of it, a narrow correlate of its having certain weights 
when placed in the suitable gravitational fields. And what Intrinsicness 
·iJtiplies is that: 
Narrowness: Each nonintrinsic property of an object must have its 
narrow correlate.40 
In fact, Narrowness and Intrinsicness are, on the dominant view, 
equivalent, since not only does Intrinsicness entail Narrowness, but 
also the converse is surely true as well. For, if extrinsic properties 
ú= have narrow correlates, then physical counterparts will certainly have all 
ú= their causal powers in common, and this is what Intrinsicness amounts 
.,...-?; 
to. 
If Narrowness is to be granted, then science and genuine explana-
tions should not violate the kind of taxonomy imposed by the maximally 
.·. countcrfactual notion of causal power that, as we saw, generates Inttin-
úyè_WáXW sácnÉssK=The relational properties of an object pick up causal powers only 
ú= IúW·W··=
;'tif they have narrow correlates.11 In Chapter 3, we purport (a) to demon-
, strate that there are no such things as narrow correlates; and (b) to chal-
lenge the notion of causal power which permits the dominant view to 
derive Intrinsicness fr01n the definition uf physical ur basic property in 
terms of the Substitutivity Test. 
2 Minimality 
The dominant view maintains that the combination of Physical Closure 
f· and Explanatory Exclusion imposes that event c's having M should 
depend on c's having N, and the exploration so far presents Strong 
' Supervenience as expressing the sort of dependence involved. In this 
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section, we intend to argue, however, that Explanatory Exclusion and y· 
Physical Closure actually call for a more stringent constraint, which we WKú=
shall call '.Minimality'. . . . _ ',i 
To begm we must recall that Explanatory Exclusion 1s committed ío !úWú=
the assumption that cases of overdetermination are rare. And, trivially, Wgú=
insofar as massive overdetermination is to be averted, one cannot in \I 
general accept that t:'o different complete causes aúÉ=responsible for the ZDXúú=
same effect. Yet that is exactly what would happen, if there could usually h1 
be two alternative bases of supervenience that were causally efficacious yú=
when a particular instantiation of a nonbasic property is causally active. WDú=
It seems then that the only way to avoid overdetermination when a non- ft úúúfú=úWúéXêúá=úK=i.s nú·úú·áúóWúúúúXWXÉúíáúú=WúúáWnag=!WíWáúNNWWúÉÉXWÉú=:11 
.··•;lil 
nience base, that is, a supervenience base that comprises no superfluous ... ···.-.•.-_ ..;.:_f .. :,:.:
or idle element. More strictly, a minimal supervenience base could be -
dÉWWú=as WWlWúWWánámal=supervenience base of a propercy S if and only I 
if P(l ... n) is a supervenience base S, and each P(i) in P(l ... n) is ' 
a necessary condition for the latter to be such a supervenience base.42 Jj 
To give an example, suppose we have a particular orange squeezer K··KúK•JXKWIúKWKW=
with a panoply of physical determinations. Of course, its functional prop-
erty 'being an orange squeezer' does not depend on the totality of its Yú=fl physical determinations. The colour and even the exact number of teeth J 
on the surface that gets in contact with oranges is irrelevant. A minimal úXN=
supervenience base would disregard these superfluous elements, and {;J 
only include those physical determinations of this particular orange Xúg=
squeezer in virtue of which it has the functional property 'being an < 
.;2 
orange squeezer', so that each of these physical determinations should \ 
·.\ úWéWÉúZúXúsaêó=component of the supervenience base which they jointly Jú=
yú=
Now, it is easy to see that only this requirement ('Minimality', here- , 
after) of a single minimal base of supervenience for each instantiation ' 
., 
of a nonbasic property deters the spread of overdetermination, and ·· 
respects the fundamental intuitions of the causal physicalist as to the '.'. 
causal relevance of nonbasic properties. Suppose that we have a set 
P(l ... n) of physical properties that is a nonminimal supervenience 
base of a particular instance of R. Hence, there must be at least ·' 
one physical property P(i) without which the previous set would still 
be a supervenience base of this particular instance of R; so that we 
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can dispense with it and still R would be instantiated. We would have 
then two different supcrvenience bases instantiated on this particular 
/ (1) 
·ii''(2) 
P(l ... n) 
P(l ... n) - P(i) 
If overdetermination should not proliferate, we cannot consider that 
these two supervenience bases are causally responsible in the same sense. 
It sounds, then, natural to say that, if (2) is enough for the actual instan-
tiation of R.) then the causal efficacy of (1) - at least, as an instance of 
F - depends on its having . (2) as an ingredient of it. So, we are bound 
,t(:rrecognize that., in this situation, it is supervenience base (2) that actu-
.. úhó=does the causal job. 
But., let us motivate Minimality in a more formal way, out of the fun-
damental principles of causal physicalism, namely: Physical Closure and 
Explanatory Exclusion. This line of reasoning will demonstrate how the 
ú= demand of single minimal bases of supervenience is connected to the 
ú= notion of a complete cause involved in those principles. We have seen 
l .Jhat, on Physical Closure, e's having physical property B must have a 
áúN}WKúomélÉíÉ=physical explanation. Specifically, there must be, in this view, 
r a' cause that is complete in such a way that each of its components is 
ú·=
· · necessary for it to count as a sufficient condition of the effect. By con-
ú=
trast, we are faced with a partial cause when only a necessary part of a 
sufficient condition is mentioned. In any case, Explanatory Exclusion 
presupposes that: 
A necessary condition for c's having N being a (partial) cause of e's 
having B is that the fonner is a necessary part of a sufficient condi-
tion for the latter.43 
Let us now suppose, as in our example in section 2, that 'M' names 
a mental property causing an effect B, that 'N' stands for a neurophys-
iological property that also causes B, and that 'B' designates a certain 
· behavioural property. According to Explanatory Exclusion, c's having 
N would not count as a cause of e's having B if the former were a 
· superfluous component of a sufficient condition for the occurrence of 
the latter; and similarly for c's having M. In that case, it is easy to see 
that for N to be causally relevant, it must be a minimal cause of B, i.e. 
a cause that is deprived of superfluous ingredients. Imagine that N is a 
non-minitnal cause of B. Thereby e would still have B even if, instead of 
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N, an alternative property N* were tokened. Just individuate N* as N 
minus N's superfluous ingredients. But, of course, N* is in fact tokened, 
and by itself guarantees, in the circumstances, the tokening of B. As a 
result, c's having N cannot be a cause of e's having B because it includes 
elements which are superfluous regarding a sufficient condition for 
the bringing about of the effect. The causal role of N is consequently 
overridden by N*. 
All this comes to emphasize that Minimality is an overall physicalist 
demand that can be equivalently expressed both in terms of superve-
nience and in terms of causation. In the latter terms, Minimality would 
demand that whenever a property P is causally responsible of an effect 
E, there must be a single minimal set of basic properties that is a com-
plete cause of E. In terms of supervenience, the requirement imposes 
that every instance of a nonbasic property P should have a single minimal 
supervenience base with no superfluous elements in it: a supervenience 
base all of whose components are necessary for the instantiation, in the 
circumstances, of the supervenient property. 
All this surely reveals something about the way the particular in-
stances of N and M are related. As we have seen in section 3, Physical 
Closure and Explanatory Exclusion straightforwardly entail that what-
ever the causal efficacy of M may be on a particular occasion, it cannot , 
go beyond the causal powers of the physical causal chain that, on this 
particular occasion, includes N as a necessary ingredient and is enough 
to causally explain B. What our recent remarks highlight is that, if N has 
to contribute to fix the causal efficacy of M on a particular occasion, 
then N has to be a necessary ingredient of a single minimal base of super-
venience of M and, therefore, a nonsuperftuous member of the minimal 
set of basic properties that, on this particular occasion, is the complete 
cause of B. 44 
This upshot is quite neutral with regard to, for instance, the contro-
versial issue among functionalists as to whether mental (functional) 
causation is just neurophysiological (physical) causation or not. So, our 
argument for Minimality does not take sides in this dispute. Inde-
pendently of the current debate about how the causal powers of super-
venient properties are exactly linked to the causal powers of subvenient 
properties, there is a widespread agreement within the dominant view 
that the two following principles hold: (i) whenever a particular instance 
of a mental property is causally efficacious there is a set of proper-
ties (neurophysiological, physical) that constitute the basis of superve-
nience of that mental property on that particular occasion; and (ii) 
the causal efficacy of the mental property on that given occasion is 
fixed by the causal efficacy of this particular supcrvenience base. Even 
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/ventional versions of functionalism seem unintelligible without 
ú Dmánámal=assumption. A conventional functionalist, even if she denies 
úí=supervenience is the whole story about how our mind is able to 
úKsalló= affect the world, is pleased to recognize that the super-
llience of mental properties upon physical properties is a sine qua non 
quirement for mental causation. Supervenience is, in Fodor's words, 
· t best idea anyone has ever had about how mental causation is 
; súáblcDK=45 
Uk that as it may, our challenge to Minimality will turn out to be 
: cial in this book. We intend to argue, in Chapter 3, that Minimality 
:rifter all self-defeating as an attempt to characterize the causal efficacy 
)(functional properties, since these properties are unable to fulfil that 
úfaandK=Furthermore, in Chapter 5, we will insist that causal physical-
··? relies on some views about causation which involve Minimality, 
·mely, which are only intelligible as expressions of the demand of 
inimally complete causal explanations. Yet, the conviction that such a 
úmand=can be satisfied in terms of physical or neurophysiological prop-
tties will be dismissed as completely implausible. In fact, we shall argue 
' 'at sticking to Minimality would force us to recognize overdetermina-
:bn as an extended phenomenon. But, as we have seen, the entire phys-
:alist argument on mental causation crucially depends on the refusal of 
assive overdetermination. 46 
Narrowness and Mental Causation 
: T is an important part of our intuitions about the causal efficacy of the 
·.· .. ental that mental states have got their causal powers in virtue of their 
):iespective content. This is an intuition that both the dominant view and 
iis would like to honour. Yet, according to causal physicalism, mental 
KúoníÉnís=can only be causally relevant if they would satisfy certain phys-
}calist constraints, namely: Narrowness and Intrinsicness. The problem 
D·KúêásÉsI=however, that there seems to be powerful arguments to the effect 
}that, at least our everyday mental contents, are individuated relationally. 
It is not an accident, then, that a lot of work in the philosophy of mind 
. had been devoted, during the last decades, to seek to reconcile the 
:, causal relevance of mental contents with the preceding physicalist 
úX consádÉêaíáons= in favour of the intrinsic character of causal powers. 
(So, let us briefly sketch the standard arguments for the relational char-
X acter of ordinary mental contents, and indicate the way in which 
_;_;; such arguments have been traditionally approached within the dominant 
<view. 
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We may begin by rehearsing the thought-experiments proposed =.;: 
respectively by H. Putnam and T. Burge.47 Putnam's piece of science ;;; 
fiction includes a hypothetical Twin-Earth, where a physical counterpart úXàI=
of Oscar dwells. Twin-Earth is identical to Earth in all respects except t' 
in those that derive from the fact that a liquid that has the same macro- .:';. · 
• •. i: 
scopic properties as water on Earth possesses a different molecular ·XXúK=
structure, say, XYZ. The question is whether Oscar's beliefs and desires 
concerning water and his twin's beliefs and desires concerning Twin-
water ('twater', for short) have the same content. Many philosophers 
have envisaged Putnam's reflections as inducing a negative answer to this 
question, even though Putnam, in 'The Meaning of Meaning', does not 
explicitly conclude that those mental contents that explain Oscar's and 
Twin-Oscar's behaviour should be externally constituted. For he just 
focuses on the meaning of natural kind terms such as 'water', 'gold', 
'silver', and so on, and argues that natural kind terms include a hidden 
indexical component: water is the stuff that bears a certain similarity )' 
relation úo=water around. here. Water at another time or in. another place !{I 
or even m another possible world, has to 'bear the relation same-L to .T'.I 
our "water" in order to be water'. 48 It follows then that, in Twin English, .:I 
'water' does not mean water .. On íhú=face. of this, one may feel tempted W gfú=
to explore how these semantic considerations may affect the content of úXú=
the mental states expressed on Twin Earth by the term 'water'. And some it. 
may be encouraged to conclude that people's thoughts on Twin Earth !úá=
do not refer to water. For, otherwise, one would have to defend an ·úN··=
implausibly sharp distinction between the content of a certain kind of )1. 
belief and the meanings involved in their most natural linguistic expres- ··úú=
sions. An externalist would typically urge that it is úêÉcáúÉló=because Xúú=
water-thoughts and twater-thoughts are concerned with different sub- W·úú=
stances, with disparate extensions, that the contents of such thoughts àú=
d 'ffi :·J1 i er too. %1 
Burge's thought-experiment is meant to expand the scope of this kind F!ú=
of externalist argument. For Putnam's cases only seem to affect those .. gú=
thoughts that somewhat refer to natural-kinds, thereby only some of our áD}Kú=
thoughts would have been proved to be extrinsically individuated. By 
contrast, Burge's examples extend this upshot to all common concepts ·úú=
by taking into consideration variations not only in the natural, but in the .. úú!úf=aúúW!úúúúúúWúWúú=!úúéaúWêWúWêKWúl=!aúúKWúWaáWI=níúúúúí=úX= ·······IDD!·W·WKWKú=.. 'i 
better to have arthritis than cancer, and so on. Let us assume that he ú=
has plenty of true beliefs about arthritis, even if he does not know every yú=
single truth about arthritis. In such a case, Burge argues, we are inclined 
to think that Will possesses the concept of arthritis and that he is in a 
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position to have arthritis-thoughts. Something must be added to the 
story, however: Will falsely believes íhúí=he has developed arthritis in his 
right thigh. This belief is false because, as a matter of social convention, 
'arthritis' only applies to a painful inflammation at the joints. 
I' At this stage, Burge proposes a counterfactual situation. Twin-Will 
I"' has exactly the same story as Will, and their corresponding social envi-
t ronment coincides in every respect but one: in Twin-Will,s environment, 
'arthritis' also applies, as a matter of social convention, to the inflam-
ú=mation of thighs. In such a case, Twin-Will truly believes that he , has developed twin-arthritis in his thigh. Arthritis-thoughts and Twin-arthritis-thoughts will therefore differ in content. We accept in the initial 
ú=description that, despite Will's false belief about having arthritis in his úúghí=thigh, Will had a background of abilities sophisticated enough to .. say of him that he has arthritis-thoughts. And this can be so because 
t commonsense ascriptions of contents allow for an incomplete un-
ú= derstanding of them. By similar reasons, Twin-Will does have Twin-
úD= arthritis-thoughts, but not arthritis-thoughts. It becomes apparent, then, 
f that, despite the fact that Twin-Will and Will coincide in all their intrin-
sic properties, their thoughts have different contents because they are 
" placed in disparate social environments. Mental contents are individu-
i:,, ated relationally, that is, they may vary in accordance with environmen-
J tal changes, even if the intrinsic properties of the organism that possesses 
them remains unaltered. 
. The dominant view has traditionally argued that these arguments only 
ú·= .. affect our commonsense theory of content, and that they do not rule out 
. the possibility of developing a technical notion of content that were more 
suitable from the viewpoint of causal explanation. If workaday contents 
ú= are broad, relational; a notion of narrow, intrinsic content ought to be 
úÉíD=elaborated.'19 As a result, a variety of notions of narrow content have been 
' proposed throughout the years. 50 In fact, this strategy seems to fit the 
. requirements imposed by Narrowness, according to which a relational 
property of an object 0 only picks up causal powers if it has a narrow 
:\;,(:.correlate, which fixes the object's contribution to the tokening of the 
relational property. 
Chapters 2 and 3 argue, by contrast, that not only mental properties, 
" but also functional (and, in general, nonbasic) properties are at pains 
úW[ ío= comfort to Narrowness and, relatedly, to Minimality. If we would 
finally succeed, then we would be in a position to benefit from a rather 
general argument against all putative theories of narrow content, as well 
as against any functionalist account of the causal efficacy of nonbasic 
properties. This being so, we will, at a later stage, proceed to revise the 
metaphysical motivation for Narrowness and Minimality, and end by 
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proposing an alternative analysis of how basic and nonbasic properties 
interrelate, which, as we shall see, poses no problem to the causal respon-
sibility of either functional or mental properties. Let us, then, begin our 
challenge to Narrowness. 
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